UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

12-5-2008

Houston v. Whittier Respondent's Brief Dckt.
35287

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"Houston v. Whittier Respondent's Brief Dckt. 35287" (2008). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 1860.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/1860

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

i

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
HOWARD HOUSTON,

Docket No. 35287

Respondent,
v.

J O m HUNTING WIHITTIER,
.. . ..

Appellant.

, .,

RESPONDENT'S BRTEF

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
INAND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
(Honorable Robert J. Elgee, Presiding District Judge)

JeMey A. Thomson
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
251 East Front Street, Suite 300
Post Office Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone: (208) 343-5454
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844
jat@elamburke.com
Thomson - ISB #3380
(Attorney for Appellant)

Ned \Villiamson
Attorney at Law
115 Second Avenue South
Hailey, ID 83333
Telephone: (208) 788-6688
Facsimile: (208) 788-7901

Robert S. Banks, Jr.
TEIE BANKSLAWOFFICE,P.C.
209 SW Oak Street, Suite 400
Portland, OR 97204
Telephone: (503) 222-7475
Facsimile (503) 467-7689
bob@bankslawo%ce.com
Granted Limited Admission Pursuant
to Idaho Bar Commission Rule 222
(Attorneys for Respondent)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLEOFAUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .iii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1.
A. Natureofthecase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1.
B. Course of the Proceedings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1. .
C. Coilcise Statement of the Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.
ISSUES ON APPEAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
.
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
.
STANDARDOFREVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16
.

..
ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
I.

THE COURT PROPERLY GRANTED HOUSTON'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE WHITTIER OFFERED NO FACTS TO
CONTRAVENE THE ALLEGATIONS AND EVIDENCE OFFERED BY
HOUSTON. THERE WERE NO MATERIAL FACTS IN DISPUTE . . . . . . . 16

11.

THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN PERMITTING THE
FILING OF THE REPLY MEMORANDUM AND SHAMES AFFIDAVIT
BECAUSE THERE WAS NO PREJUDICE TO WHITTIER AND WHITTIER
WAS GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO FILE ANY RESPONSIVE
AFFIDAVITS. BUT DID NOT DO SO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

111.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT THE OREGON
SECURITIES LAWS APPLY TO THE SALE OF WOOD RIVER TO
HOUSTON BECAUSE THE UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE WAS THAT
ALL SOLICITATIONS WERE DIRECTED TO HOUSTON IN OREGON . . . 2 1
A.

The Oregon Law Specifically Provides That It Governs Securities
Transactions In Which Offers To Purchase Are Directed To Oregon . . . 21

B.

The District Court Did Not Coxntnit Error In Refusing To Strilce The
Shames Affidavit Because It Set Forth Admissible, Unrefbted Facts That
The Wood River Offer Was Directed to Houston In Oregon . . . . . . . . .24

C.

IV.

Even If The District Court Had Improperly Applied Oregon Law, Any
Error Would Have Been Harmless Because The Liability Provisions Of
Idaho's Securities Laws Are Identical And Idaho's Damages Calculations
Would Be More Onerous To Whittier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

WHITTIER'S GUILTY PLEA TO THREE FELONY COUNTS OF
SECURITIES FRAUD PRECLUDE I-IIM FROM DENYING FACTUAL
ALLEGATIONS OF MISREPRESENTATION AND OMISSIONS THAT
ESTABLISH LIABILITY HERE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..2 7
A.

This Court Need Not Reach The Issue Preclusion Question To Decide
This Case Because S w n q Judgment Was Supported By Whittier's
Failure To Deny The Controlling Facts In This Record . . . . . . . . . . . .. 2 7

B.

The Proper Test For Applying Issue Preclusion Resulting From A Guilty
Plea To A Subsequent Civil Action Is Found In Anderson v. City of
Pocatello . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..28

C.

Each of the Three Elemelits Of The Anderson Test Were Satisfied . . . . 30

1.

Full and fair opportunity to litigate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..30

2.

.
Identical Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..30

3.

Actually decided . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..3 2

V.

WHITTIER'S ARGUMENT THAT HOUSTON FAILED TO TENDER THE
WOOD RIVER SECURITIES TO HIM IS CONTRADICTED BY THE
RECORD AND MISSTATES THE TENDER REQUIREMENT . . . . . . . . . ..33

VI.

WHITTIER'S ARGUMENT THAT HOUSTON DID NOT MOVE FOR
SUMMARY .JUDGMENT ON THE ISSUE OF DAMAGES HAS NO SUPPORT
IN THE RECORD BECAUSE HOUSTON SPECIFICALLY MOVED FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON TWO CLAIMS FOR RELIEF AND
INTRODUCED ALL THE REQUIRED EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE
AMOUNT OF RESCISSIONARY DAMAGES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..3 7

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39
..

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES

Andersoiz v. City ofPocatello. 112 Idaho 176 (1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
. .32
Bennett v. Bliss. 103 Idaho 358. 647 P.2d 814 (Ct. App . 1982)

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16.
. 19

Fresk v. Kraenzer. 337 Ore. 513 (Or. 2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Metal Tech Corp. v. Metal Teckniques Co., 74 Ore. App . 297. 703 P.2d 237 (1985) . . . . . . . . . 35
Psince v. Brydon. 307 Ore . 146. 764 P.2d 1370 (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23
.
Securities and Exchaizge Conznzissioiz 11. Wood River Capital Management. et al.
No 05 CV 8713 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
..
Si~zithv . Mitton. 140 Idaho 893 (Ida110 2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
State ex reL Department of Labor & Indus . Sen,ices . v. Hill,

118Idaho278(IdahoCt.App.1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17.
State ofIdaho v . Teizney.I24 Idaho 243. 858 P.2d 782 (1993)

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
.

Stinzinel v. Sheamon. Ii'ami~zill&Co.. 41 1 F . Supp. 345 (D . Or . 1976) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
.
United States ofA71zericav. John 111: faittier. No . 07 Crim. 087 (S.D.N.Y. Feb 1,2007). . . . . 12
STATUTES

Idaho
IC

""
3 18-2304
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28
..

I.C.§28.22.104(2)
I.C.$30.14.509.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
...
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
...

I.C.5121 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16
.

Ore~on
ORS 20.080 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ORS 59.115 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ORS 59.1 15(1)(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ORS 59.1 15(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ORS 59.1 15(10) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ORS 59.135 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ORS 59.335 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ORS59.345 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22
..
ORS82.010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26
..

COURT RULES
I.R.C.P. 5(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19
..
I.R.C.P. 56(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16,19,
.
21

REGULATIONS

OTHXR AUTHORITY
The 2002 Uiliform Securities Act 5 509 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case. Between February and September, 2005, Respondent Howard
Houston was lured into making eight separate investments in Wood River Partners, L.P ("Wood
River"), totaling $2.75 million. Whittier was the general partner and manager of Wood River, a
national investment which he based in Blaine County. Whittier misled investors and co~ntnitted
securities fraud in operating Wood River. Whittier and Wood River were sued by the Securities
and Exchange Co~nmissionin New York, which filed its action to remove control of Wood River
from Whittier and place it into receivership. Whittier was also indicted by a federal grand jury in
New York and prosecuted by the United States for criminal securities fraud for his Wood River
activities. Whittier pled guilty to three felony counts in the U.S. District C o w for the Southern
District of New York in February, 2007, and is currently serving a federal prison sentence for his
crimes. Houston sued Whittier in Blaine County, alleging Whittier's violation of the Oregon
Securities Laws, which prohibit the offering and sale of securities in Oregon by means of
misrepresentations and omissions. In October, 2007, Houston moved for summary judgment on
two of his six claims for relief. The motion was granted and final judgment was entered in favor
of Houston in March, 2008. This appeal followed.

B. Course of the Proceedings. Houston filed his complaint on August 30,2006. R. p 5.
Whittier initially answered, challenging personal jurisdiction over him in Idaho, even though he
was a resident of and served with the complaint in Blaine County. Whittier then filed an Answer
to the Complaint on December 7,2006. R. p. 37 - 62. In the Answer, Whittier did not admit or
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deny any allegation in the complaint other than to admit that Wood River had been placed into
receivership by a federal district court in New York. Id. As to all other allegations, Whittier
asserted a Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination,which he claimed arose out of
the civil action that was filed against him by the Securities and Exchange Commission (separate
from the criminal indictment filed against him by the United States). R. pp. 38 - 61.
In February, 2007, Whittier pled guilty to three of the four felony charges against him in
the New York felony indictment. R., Clerk's Exhibit 1 (Banks Declaration, Exhibit C, p. 17) .
Ten months after the guilty plea, on October 30,2007, Houston filed a Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment. R. p. 85-86. Houston argued during the summary judopent proceedings
that he was entitled to partial summary judgment on the first and second claims for relief for two
reasons: (1) Whittier's guilty plea prevented Whittier from denying that he had made certain
misrepresentations about Wood River; and (2) Whittier had never denied the factual allegations in
this case, and did not present any evidence controverting Houston's submissions. R. p. 89,
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum In Support of Motion For
Partial Su~nmaryJudgment, pp. 2-3 (included as Exhibit 3 to Appellant's Motion to Augment
Record). Houston's motion was supported by an Affidavit of Howard Houston, and Declaration
of Robert S. Banks, Jr., and exhibits, which were filed and received without objection. Clerk's
Exhibits 1, 2 (identified at R. 177).

On January 14,2008, nearly three months after Houston filed his motion for partial
summary judgment, Whittier filed a memorandum in opposition to the summary judgment
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together with the Affidavit of John Whittier. Supreme Court Order Granting Motion to Augment
Record, Exhibits 1, 2. Whittier's Affidavit in opposition to surnmary judgment was olily six
paragraphs, and did not coiltravene any of the facts offered in support of Houston's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment. Whittier's memorandum in opposition to the summary judgment
raised for the first time his argument that the Oregon law did not apply to this case.
Houston filed a Reply Memorandum on January 22,2008, together with a Declaratioli of
Peter Shames. Supreme Court Order Granting Motion to Augment Record, Exhibit 2; R. p. 102104. Those documents were filed and served on Whittier's counsel on Januay 22,2008. The
Shames Declaration was filed to address Whittier's new contention that the Oregon law was
inapplicable.
On January 24,2008, Whittier filed a motion to strike the Shames declaration and the
reply brief. Supreme Court Order Granting Motion, Exhibit 4. Whittier contended that the reply
brief and Shames Declaration had been filed and served one day late. He further contended that
the Shames Declaration was not an affidavit, and included inadmissible hearsay statements.
On January 28, 2008, the district court held a hearing on (1) Houston's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment; (2) Defendant's Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint; and (3)
Whittier's Motion to Strike Houston's Reply Memorandum and the Shames Declaration. At that
hearing, Houston moved the court to replace the Shames Declaration with the Affidavit of Peter
Shames, which contained the identical sworn declaration statement of Mr. Shames, but was in
affidavit format.
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On February 1, 2008, the district court signed an interim Order which (1) denied
Whittier's motion to file an amended answer; (2) granted Whittier's motions to strike the
declarations of Shames and Banks, but granted Houston's motions to substitute affidavits for the
declarations; (3) granted Whittier until February 14,2008, to file any response to the Shames
Affidavit; and (4) denied Whittier's motion to strike the reply brief. R. 110-113.
The February 1,2008 Order also made the following findings of fact and based upon
uncontradicted facts submitted by Houston:
a. that Houston made eight investments in Wood River from February, 2005 through
September, 2005, totaling $2,750,000;
b. that the sale of the Wood River securities to Houston was made by untrue statements of
material fact and onlissions to state material facts, and that Houston was unaware of those untrue
statements and omissions;
c. that during the times that Houston made his purchases, Whittier was a managing
partner, officer and/or director of Wood River. R. 110-113.
The February 1,2008 Order reserved for further proceedings the question of wl~ether
Oregon or Idaho law applied to the sales of Wood River to Houston, and invited further briefing
on that issue. Id.
The parties filed further briefs on whether the Oregon law applied on February 21 and
February 26,2008. Whittier filed a Memorandum in Support of the Application of the Idaho
Uniform Securities Act. R. p. 114 - 123. Houston filed Plaintiffs Menlorandurn Regarding
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Application of Oregon Law, R. p. 130 -138, and Affidavit of Robert S. Banks, Jr. in Support of
Entry of Final Judgment, R. p. 139-143.
Whittier also filed objections to the form of the judgment that Houstoll had proposed. R.
144-153. In his objections, Whittier contended that the "tender requirement" of the securities
laws requires delivery of tile securities to the defendant, with no obligatiolls of the defendant to
pay for the securities. Whittier also contended in that motion that plaintiff only sought s m l a r y
judgment on the issue of liability, not damages. Id Houston filed a Reply Memorandum to
Whittier's objections. R. p. 154-160.
The district court held the hearing by telephone on February 27,2008. After hearing
argument from the parties and considering the briefs, the district court issued an Order on Entry of
Judgment on March 19,2008. In that Order, the district court made specific findings, and
concluded that the Oregon securities law applied to Houston's claims, and that Houston had
satisfied the tender requirement of the securities laws by sending a letter in which Houstoi~
tendered the securities upon payment of the amount of the judgment. R. p. 161-165. The Order
determined that the entry of summay judgment in favor of Houston was appropriate. R. p. 163.
The district court also made the following specific findings:
a. The Affidavit of Howard Houston filed on October 30, 2007 clearly set forth the
amount of Houston's investments, and that the amounts and dates were never controverted by
Whittier. R. p. 161.
b. Houston moved for summary judgment on the first and second claims for relief, and
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never limited his motion for partial summary judgment to liability issues. R. p. 162.
c. Houston had satisfied his obligations to tender the securities back to Whittier by doing
so conditional upon payment. The district court rejected Whittier's argument that Houston must
actually send his rights and title in Wood River to Whittier in federal prison without any
obligation on Whittier's part to pay for it. The court also noted that there was no evidence that
Whittier paid for or even offered to pay for Houston's Wood River interest (and in fact Whittier
has not satisfied any of the judgment as of this writing). R. p. 163.
The district court then entered a Final Judgment in favor of Houston for $3,234,881 on
March 19,2008. R. p. 166-67.
I-iouston filed an unopposed lnotion for dismissal of the third, fourth, fifth and sixth clainls
for relief, which were not subject to the partial summary judgment motion, which was granted on
March 25,2008. R. p. 169-70.
Wittier then timely filed this appeal.
C. Concise Statement of the Facts.
1. Wittier was the general partner of Wood River from February, 2003 through the Fall
of 2005. R., Clerk's Exhibit 1 (Banlts Declaration, Exhibit C, lines 20-21). In addition, Whittier
was the principal and managing member of the general partner for Wood River, Wood River
Associates, LLC. Whittier was also the managing member of Wood River Capital Management,
LLC, which was responsible for administrative matters for Wood River. R., Clerk's Exhibit 2
(Affidavit of Howard Houston, Exhibit B, p. 3).
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2. On or about June 2004, Whittier and Wood River issued a Confidential Private
Offering Memorandum ("Offering Memorandum"), which set forth the tenns of Wood River and
its investment program. Plaintiff Howard Houston was sent a copy of that Offering
Memorandum. R., Clerk's Exhibit 2 (Affidavit of Howard Houston, 13, Exhibit B).

3 In addition, Whittier and Wood River prepared a Confidential Summary of the Wood
River investment. Plaintiff Howard Houston was sent a copy of that document as well. Id., 12,
Exlibit A.

4. The Confidential Summa~ystated that Wood River would:
A. Be a diversified investment that would be "Flexible and Nimble" and would use
"Bottom Up Fundamental Research , Sector Selection and Technical Analysis." Id., Exhibit A, p.
2.
B. Be diversified with a focus on the media, communications, health care, biotechnology,
financial services, technology and internet, telecommunications, consumer staples, and consumer
cyclicals sectors. Id.

5 Likewise, the Offering Memorandum represented that the Wood River investment
would be a balanced and diversified investment designed to limit losses. R., Clerk's Exhibit 2
(Affidavit of Howard Houston, Exhibit B,) The Offering Memorandum specifically represented
that Wood River would:
A. Achieve capital appreciation through the combination of long and short equity

investments in a diversified number of industries. Affidavit of Howard Houston, Exlibit B, pp.
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B. Malce "broad based" investments. Id..
C. "[Tlypically hold 30-40 long positions." Id.
D. Cap all long positions at "1 0% of the original cost" and cap all short positions at "5%
of the original cost." Id. at p. 11.
E. Deliver "consistent absolute returns for its limited partners." Id.
F. Base its investment strategy on fundamental research, as well as both qualitative and
quantitative analysis." Id.

6. Ln late 2004, Houston was solicited to make an investment in Wood River. R. Cleric's
Exhibit 2, Affidavit of Howard Houston, 7 2,3. Houston received a copy of the Offering
Memorandum and the Confidential Summary. Id.

7. Houstoll reviewed the Wood River materials he received with his assistant, Peter
Shames. Based on representations made in the Offering Memorandum and Confidential Summary,

Mr. Houston agreed to invest in Wood River. Affidavit of Howard Houston qj 4.
8. Although the Offering Memorandum stated that tlie minimum investment was
$1,000,000, Mr.Whittier allowed Mr. Houston to make an initial contribution of $250,000, with
the understanding that he would make additional contributions if Houston was satisfied with Wood
River's performance. Affidavit of Howard Houstol~7 5.

9. Mr. Houston invested in Wood River in the following amounts by delivering funds to
Wood River's bank account at the First Bank of Idaho in Ketchum, Idaho:
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February 2005

$250,000

March 2005

$250,000

April 2005

$500,000

May 2005

$250,000

June 2005

$250,000

July 2005

$500,000

August 2005

$250,000

September 2005

$500,000

Mr. Houston's total cash investment in Wood River was $2,750,000. Afidavit of I-Ioward
Houston 7 6.
10. Houston agreed to make his colltributions after February, 2005 based upon his
understandillg that the investment parameters for Wood River as described to him had not changed,
and upon his understanding that the fund was performing well. Affidavit of Howard Houston 7 1
6, 7, 9,10.
11. Houston received periodic performance reports from Whittier and Wood River. Each
of the reports he received represented that the fund was making money, and was well diversified.
None of the reports ever suggested that the fund was concentrated in any particular security or
securities. Affidavit of Howard Houston 7 6,7, 9, 10.For example, Houston's assistant, Peter
Shames, received a Wood River report from Whinier dated July 26,2005 which listed the top five
holdings of Wood River, and stated that they represented 4-5% of all of Wood River's Holdings.
Page 9
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They included Microsoft, Sirius Satellite, and E-Bay. That July report also represented that the 6th
through 10th biggest holdings represented 3-3.5% of Wood River's holdings. Those stocks
included such well known stocks as Yahoo! Endwave was not listed anywhere in the top ten
holdings. Affidavit of 13oward Houston 7 8, Exhibit C. Endwave was only listed in the Top 10
small capidistressed holdings, which were identified as "weighted 2-2.5%" of the total Wood River
portfolio. Id.
12. Whittier's representations about Wood River's holdings and performance were false.
Wood River's July, 2005 brokerage statements that the Securities and Exchange Commissioll
obtained indicate that, at the end of July, 2005, the Endwave position at Wood River was
5,150,523 shares. The Endwave shares were worth approximately $180 million, and comprised
65% of Wood River's assets under managemelit. At that time, which was the date Whittier sent
the report to Houston described in the previous paragraph, Wood River owned more than 45% of
all outstanding shaves of Endwave. R., Clerk's Exhibit l(Banks Declaration, Exhibit D.
(Declaration of Charles Joshua Felker In Support Of Plaintiffs Application For Entry Of An Order
Granting A Prelilniilary Injunction), f/ 22. ).
13. Endwave was no Microsoft. It was a sinall cap technology company that admitted in
its March, 2005 Form 10K filing that "We have had a history of losses. We had a net loss of $4.4
million in 2004. We also had net losses of $31.0 million and $7.9 rnillio~lfor the years ended
December 3 1,2002 and 2003, respectively." Banks Declaration, Exhibits E, F (2004 l0K and
2005 10K SEC filings). In fact, Endwave never had never reported a profitable year. It was also a
Page 10
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small public company. Its March 4,2004 Form 10K filing reported that it had only 108 employees
Id.

14. Endwave was also a volatile stock. It traded in ranges from less than $10 to over $50
per share while Whittier was accuinulating it. It was also thinly traded. Except during the times
that Whittier was acquiring it, its total daily trading volume of both purchases and sales was less
than the 5 million shares that Wood River secretly owned. Banks Declaration, Exhibit G.
(Endwave perfo~manceand volume chart). In other words, there was no visible market for the
Endwave shares if Wood River desired or needed to sell them.
15. Mr. Houston had never heard of Endwave while he was investing $2.75 lniilion in
Wood River. Houston was unaware that Wood River was so concentrated in Endwave. Had he

known that, he would not have considered an investment into Wood River. Affidavit of Howard
Houston 7 10.
16. By mid-September, representatives of BNP Paribas (BNP), a large iilstitutional
investor in Wood River, had been pressing Wood River Partners and Whittier to redeem a $49
million investment BNP had made on behalf of a customer. BNP had given notice of its
redemption on June 29, the redemption amount was determined as of July 29, and the redemption
payment had come due at the end of August. Whittier was unable to meet that redemption request.
See Banks Declaration, Exhibit D (Declaration of Charles Joshua Felker In Support Of Plaintiff's
Application For Entry Of An Order Granting A Preliminary Injunction, 7 26-27).
17. Whittier never told Houston that Wood River was unable to meet redemption requests
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of its investors. Whittier accepted Houston's $1.25 nlillion contribution to Wood River from July
through September, 2005, while Wood River was so illsolvent it could not fill the redemption
request. Had Housto11been told that Wood River was illiquid and concentrated in Endwave stock,
he would not have invested $1.25 millioll in that time period. Affidavit of Howard Houston 7 7
10. 11.
18. After Whittier was unable to meet redemption requests for BNP and other investors in
Wood River, the Securities and Exchange Comlission filed a civil lawsuit against Whittier and
the Wood River entities for fraud, injunctive relief, and to place Wood River into receivership. A
federal court in New York placed Wood River into receivership in November, 2006, and it
remained there to the time of the entry of judgment in this case (and is still pending as of this
writing). Banks Declaration, Exhibit A. (Order For Injunctive Relief in Securities and Exchange

Coi~znzissionv. Wood River Capital Managei~zent,et al, No 05 CV 8713 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)).
19. A federal grand j u y issued a criminal indictment against Whittier in February, 2007 in

UnitedStates ofAi~zerica1). John H.Whittier, No. 07 Crim. 087 (S.D.N.Y. Feb 1,2007). Banks
Declaration, Exhibit B (Indictment). The indictment charged four c o u ~ t of
s securities fraud in
connection with the failure to disclose the Media Bay and Endwave positions to illvestors; and
failure to report holdings of Media Bay in excess of 10% of the outstanding stock; and failure to
r e p o ~holdings in excess of 5% and 10% of Media Bay stock, another stock in which Wood River
was overconcentrated. Id.
20. On May 30,2007, Whittier pled guilty to three of the four counts in the indictment. He
Page 12

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

pled guilty to Counts 1 , 2 and 4 of the indictment. Banks Declaration, Exhibit C. (Transcript of
Proceedings of May 30,2007, p. 17).
21. Count 1 of the criminal indictment alleged that Whittier created and iniplemented a
scheme to defraud Wood River investors by: (1) acquiring more than 70% of the stock of Endwave
without disclosing that fact to investors; (2) falsely representing to Wood River investors that he
would pursue a broad investment strategy in which no one holding would comprise more than 10%
of Wood River's assets; and (3) falsely representing to Wood River iilvestors that the fund was
being audited by outside investors. Balks Declaration, Exhibit B. (Indictment 7 9 ). Whittier pled
guilty to this count. Banks Declaration, Exhibit C. (Transcript of Proceedings of May 30,2007, p.
17).
i
I

i

I
I

I

i

22. Count 3 of the criminal indictment alleged that Whittier acquired more than 10% of the
outstanding stock of Endwave and failed to disclose that ownership, contrary to SEC rules. B a k s
Declaration Exhibit B, Indictment at qj 51. Whittier pled guilty to this count. Banks Declaration,
Exhibit C. (Transcript of Proceedings of May 30,2007, p. 17).
23. Count 4 of the criminal indictment alleged that Whittier also acquired for Wood River
a large position in a company called Media Bay that was more than 20% of all of the outstanding

I

stock of Media Bay. Further, Whittier did not disclose to the investing public or Wood River
I

i

i

investors his position in an effort to defraud investors. B a k s Declaration Exhibit B, Indictment at

qqj 53, 54.

Whittier pled guilty to this count. Banks Declaration, Exhibit C. (Transcript of

I

Proceedings of May 30,2007, p. 17).

j

1
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I

i
I

j

I

1

I
I

i
I
i
I

I
i
i

24. 111entering his plea of guilty to counts 1, 3 and 4 of the indictment against him,
Whittier stated under oath in open court that:
I was general partner of Wood River Partners from 2003 tlrcough the fall of 2005
and Wood River Offshore .from July of 2005 through the fall of 2005.
capacity I engaged in wrongful conduct, including intentionally concealing the
size of mv beneficial ownership position in a public companv called Endwave
Corporation. I purchased and sold Endwave stock knowin0 that the true-the
truth regarding my Endwave holdings was material information that was not
publicly lmown.

As general partner of both funds, I misled mv investors in several wavs. For
example, I knowinglv and intentionally failed to cause the timely filing of
forms with the SEC pursuant to Rules 13d-1 and 16a, disclosing that I
beneficiallv owned in excess of 5% and 10%"res~ectivelv,of shares of
Endwave.
Further, the undisclosed concentrated position in the Endwave securitv far
exceeded the maximum cap for a single stock provided for in the funds !sic1
stated investment parameters.
In addition, in the summer of 2005. I caused a false filing of a schedule 13D-G
form, which did not accurately disclosed the complete and beneficial
ow~nershipI had of a companv called Media Bav. At the time of the filing I
knew that this was material information.
I knew at the time that I was doing wrong. I've embarrassed myself and my family
and caused hann to my investors.
Banks Declaration, Exhibit C, (Transcript of proceedings at 14-15).

I

25. On December 7,2006, Whittier filed an Answer and Demand for Jury Trial, in which

,

1

he refused to answer any of the allegations in the Complaint. R. p. 37-63. Wittier based his

II

refusal to answer a31d his invocation of the Fifth Amendment on the basis that there was a federal

i

civil lawsuit filed against Whittier by the Securities and Exchange Commission. Whittier did not

j
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mention the criminal indictment filed against him by the United States in seeking to invoke his
Fifth Amendment Privilege.
26. Whittier did not offer any evidence to refute any of the followillg facts in Plaintiff's
Complaint:
A. Whittier controlled the Wood River investment. R. 7, f j 6;

B. IHouston received written information about Wood River which made certain
representations. R. 9-1 1, f j 12 - 16.
C. Houston invested $2.75 million in Wood River based upon those representations. R.

11-12,fj 18; and
D. The documents Houston received about Wood River included material
misrepresentations and onlined to state material facts. R. 12-16,

qfj 19-21.

27. Whittier did not offer any evidence to refute Houston's sworn statement in his
affidavit that he was unaware of the multiple n~isrepresentationsand omissioi~sWhittier had made
to induce him to invest in Wood River. /fj 4, 7-12.

ISSUES ON APPEAL
The issues on appeal are set forth in the Appellant's Brief at pages 6 -7.

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
Houston requests attorney fees on this appeal pursuant to ORS 59.115(10), which provides
that "the court may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party in an action under" ORS
59.115, the statute under which the district court granted summary judgment. Houston did not
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move the court for attorney fees in the district cowt in order to save time and expense. Now that
Whittier has forced him into another court proceeding, he requests his reasonable attorney fees
incurred on this appeal. In deciding the attorney fee issue on appeal, Houstoll respectfully requests
that this Court take into consideration Whittier's coilduct in the district court in addition to the
filing of this appeal. In addition, Houston requests attorney fees pursuant to I.C. $ 12-120, relating
to coinmercial transactions, and 5 12-121, on grounds that the appeal is frivolous.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Houston agrees with the general standards of review described in Appellant's Brief at 9.
However, as to the issue of whether the district court erred in pern~ittingthe filing of the Reply
Memorandum and the Shames Affidavit, tl-ie correct standard of review is abuse of discretioil.
I.R.C.P. 56(c)("court may alter or sl-~ortenthe time periods and requirements of this rule for good
cause shorn"); Berzrzett 1). Bliss, 103 Idaho 358,360,647 P.2d 814 (Ct. App. 1982).

ARGUMENT
1.

THE COURT PROPERLY GRANTED HOUSTON'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE WHITTIER OFFERED NO FACTS TO
CONTRAVENE THE ALLEGATIONS AND EVIDENCE OFFERED BY
HOUSTON. THEKE WERE NO MATERIAL FACTS IN DISPUTE
This appeal can largely be decided by applying the facts described above to the familiar

standards in Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c) and (e). Rule 56(c) provides that summary
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judgment shall be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to ajudgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(e) provides:
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, but the party's
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If
the party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate,
shall be entered against the party.

See also: State ex rel. Departnzent ofLabor & Indus. Seniices. v. Ifill, 118 Idaho 278,284 (Idaho
Ct. App. 1990)(applying Rule 56(e)).
Here, Houston set forth a detailed statement of facts in his Complaint. R. pp. 6-16.

Jil

moving for sumlary jud-pent, he filed contemporaneous sworn statements of Howard Houston
and Robert S. Banks Jr. Clerk's Exhibits 1,2. Houston's affidavit in particular describes the
representations that Whittier and the offering materials made, which convinced hiin to invest $2.75
millioll over eight montl~s. Houston's statement further describes how Wluttier sent out supposed
progress reports showing a positive performance of Wood River that contained outright lies. The
attachmeiits to the Banks Declaration, particularly Exhibits A and D, detail what was actually
occurring at Wood River. Clerk's Exhibit 1
Whittier neither objected to nor offered evidence in any form to contravene the record filed
by Houston. Whittier had ample opportunities to do so. He was served with Houston's summary
judgment motion on October 31,2007. When Whittier responded on Ja~iuay14,2008, he filed an
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affidavit in response to Houston's summary judgment motion. However, it was only six
paragraphs long, and did not dispute a77y of the facts that Houston had offered in support of his
motion. Supreme Court Order Granting Motion, Exhibit 2. After the summary judgment hearing
on January 3 1, The district court's interim Order granted Whittier a11 additional two weeks to file
any affidavits in opposition to the Shames Affidavit. R. p. 110-113. Whittier again failed to offer
any facts to create a genuine issue of any material fact upon which the s m a r y judgment motion
was based.
As Houston pointed out in the district court:

Therefore, regardless of any issues relating to presunzptions and the
FVth Anzendnzent,regardless of the doct~dinesof issue preclusion and
clainz preclusion, and regardless of ~1hetherWhittieris perinitted to
Jile an amended answer: there are sinzply no facts in dispute. Wood
River was sold by means of statements made in an offering circular.
Those statements, Wittier has admitted, were untrue. The sale of a
security by means of untrue statements is a violation of ORS 59.1 15
and ORS 59.135. Whittier is a person liable for the sale as a seller,
andlor as a "partner, limited liability company manager, including a
member who is a manager, officer or director of such seller"
pursuant to ORS 59.1 15(3). Whittier admits to being a partner and
the manager of Wood River Partners, and of controlling its trading
operations. All liability factors have been established. There are no
issues left to try on the First or Second Claims For Relief.
Supreme Cow? Order Granting Motion, Exhibit 3 (Reply Memorandurn at 3)
Based upon the undisputed record, The district court properly granted Ilouston's motion for
partial s m n a r y judgment. R 161-165.

11.

THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN PERMITTING THE
FILING OF THE REPLY MEMORANDUM AND SHAMES AFFIDAVIT
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BECAUSE THERE WAS NO PREJUDICE TO WHITTIER AND WHITTIER WAS
GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO PILE ANY RESPONSIVE AFFIDAVITS, BUT
DID NOT DO SO.
Whittier assigns as error the district court's decision to deny Whittier's Motion to Strike
Houston's Reply Memorandum and the Declaration of Peter Shames. Whittier relies upon Rule
56(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides "[tlhe moving party may thereafter
serve a reply brief not less than 7 days before the date of the hearing." Rule 56 does not address
when service is complete, because that is addressed in Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b), which
provides that "[slervice by mail is complete upon mailing." The parties agree that "[bloth the
Shanles Declaration and the Reply Memorandum were served on Whittier by Federal Express
overnight mail on January 22, 2008." Appellant's Brief at 10. The hearing was held on the
afternoon of January 28,2008, so the brief was served six days before the hearing instead of the
seven provided for in the rule
Rule 56(c) grants district courts discretion to shorten the time periods. It states that "[tlhe
court may alter or shorten the time periods and requirements of this rule for good cause shown,
may continue the hearing." See also: Benizett v. Bliss, 103 Idaho 358, 360, 647 P.2d 814 (Ct. App.
1982) (motion for an exteilsioll of time to file additional affidavits, depositions, and interrogatories
in opposition to a motion for summay judgment lies within the discretion of the district court).
The district court was acting within the express discretion granted by Rule 56(c) in
allowing the reply brief and declaration to be filed. In fairness, Houston had served Whittier with
the Motion for Partial Sunm~aryJudgment on October 30,2007. R pp. 85-87. Whittier served a
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response two and a half months later, on Friday, January 11,2008, and it was received on Monday,
January 14. Houston took eight days to file his response, and had to address defenses relatii~gto
the application of Oregon law that Whittier had not previously raised. Moreover, Houston's Reply
Menioralidum was limited to ten pages. And, since Houston extended the courtesy of serving the
Reply Memorandum and supporlillg papers by Federal Express overnight delivery, Whinier's
actual receipt of the papers was sooner than it would have been had Houston timely served them by
First Class Mail on January 21. Finally, with respect to the arguments in the Reply Memorandum,
Houston's could have simply made an oral presentation at tlie hearing raising all of the arguments
and authorities made in the Reply Memorandum. It was more helpful to the district court and
counsel to be able to also consider the arguments iii written form. Houston acknowledges that he
should have filed his reply a day sooner, but there was no prejudice to Whittier and the court acted
withii its discretion ui allowing the filing.
Whittier complaiils that the Shames Declaration "prese~itednew and different factual
infonnation." Appellant's Brief at 12. The oiily purpose of Mr. Shames's statement was to
address the issue of the applicatio~iof the Oregon Securities Laws to the sale of Wood River to
Houston, an Oregon resident. Whittier had never raised that issue in his stated affirmative
defenses, R. 59-61, or anywhere else in his Answer. Whittier was required to do so under Rule
12(b) of the Idaho Rules, which provides that "Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in
any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim, shall be asserted in
the responsive pleading thereto if one is required."
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Whinier was at no disadvantage as a result of the filing of the Shames's Affidavit. The
district court gave Whittier until Februay 14,2008, to file any response to the Shames Affidavit

i

and the Oregon law argument. Record p. 112,77. Under Rule 43(e), The district court could

I

i

I

have heard evidence supporting motions by oral testimo~iyat the hearing. Furthermore, The
district court scheduled another hearing to allow tlle p a i e s to further argue the issues that the

I

Shanles Affidavit addressed on February 27,2008. Record p. 112, 7,
j

I

I

The district court exercised precisely the type of discretion that Rule 56(c) conteniplates. It
considered the circumstances and realities of the case. It made sure that tliere was no prejudice, and
it provided both sides with ample opportunities to submit any evidence and arguments that they
wanted him to consider. If the district court abused its discretioli here by allowing the service of

I

tlie brief one day late under the circumstances of this case, then the mandate of Rule 56(c)

i

allowing district courts to "alter or shorten the time periods and requiremelits of this rule for good

I
cause shown" becomes lneaningless

i

111.

I
I

8

I

i
i
1

I

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT THE OREGON
SECURITIES LAWS APPLY TO THE SALE OF WOOD RIVER TO HOUSTON
BECAUSE THE URTCONTROVERTEDEVIDENCE WAS THAT ALL
SOLICITATIONS WERE DIRECTED TO HOUSTON IN OREGON.
A.

The Oregon Law Specifically Provides That It Governs Securities Transactions
In Which Offers To Purchase Are Directed To Oregon.

The Oregon statutes define when Oregon law applies to a securities transactioli with a
nexus to Oregon, and the statutory language makes clear that the Oregon securities laws
apply to .Mr. Houston's $2.75 million purchase of Wood River. ORS 59.335 provides:
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(1) ORS 59.055,59.115 to 59.125,59.135 and 59.145 and subsection
(1) of ORS 59.165 apply to persons who sell or offer to sell when:
(a) An offer to sell is made in this state
ORS 59.345, in turn, provides:
(1) For the purpose of ORS 59.335, an offer to sell or to buy is made
in this state, whether or not either warty is then present in this state,
when the offer:
(a) Originates from this state; or

(b) Is directed bv the offeror to this state and received at the place to
which it is directed (or at any post office in this state in the case of a
mailed offer). (emphasis added)
In Stimmel v.Skeauson, Hanznzill & Co., 41 1 F. Supp. 345 (D. Or. 1976), the court was
faced with the issue of whether the Oregon securities laws applied to transactions in which the
defendants were in California. There, the plaintiffs actually initiated contact with the defendants by
visiting them in defendants' offices in California. Plaintiffs subsequently bought and sold securities
through defendants, by telephone calls which were initiated sometiines by defendants froin
California, and sometimes by plaintiffs from Oregon. There was no claim of fraud in that case -the
defendants merely had not registered to sell securities in Oregon, believing that the plaintiffs were
California residents. Still, the Stinzmel court was comnpelied to find that the Oregon securities laws
governed the transaction because the solicitations were directed to Oregon.
It is well recognized in securities law jurisprudence that states may enact and enforce
securities laws for transactions that are directed to occur within their borders. Cases are
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routinely brought by states and private litigants for violation of state securities laws by persons
who are not found in t l ~ estate. If it were otherwise, states would be powerless to regulate
transactions directed to their citizens by non-residelits. Given the interstate nature of the vast
majority of securities transactions, that would mean that state securities laws would be virtually
unenforceable. Thus, in Oregon, for example, the Oregon Supreme Court held that ail Idaho
lawyer could be liable under Oregon securities statutes for prepaxing offering documents in
Idaho for an investment sold in Oregon. Prince v. Brydon, 307 Ore. 146, 150,764
P.2d 1370 (1988).
Idaho courts are no different. The Idaho Court of Appeals in State ofIdaho v. Tenizey,
124 Idaho 243, 858 P.2d 782 (1993), affirmed a trial court's finding that a non-resident was
liable for violatio~lsof the Idaho Securities Act. The court found, in a personal jurisdiction
context, that an individual who prepared offering materials outside Idalio to be used in Idaho to
solicit iiivestors was subject to Idaho jurisdiction in a claim brought by the state for violations of
the Idaho Securities Act, i.e. 5 30-1401,even though he never came to Idaho and had no offices
or employees there. Id. at 246. The court affirmed findings against him for violatioils of the
Idaho Securities Act.
The Idaho Supreme Court should affirm the application of the Oregon Securities Laws
when a11 offering is directed to an Oregon citizen from Idaho, just as Oregon would certainly
enforce Idaho's laws if an Idaho citizen sued a defendant located in Orego11 who directed an illegal
offering to Idaho. This Court should give full faith and credit to the Oregon statutes as the apply to
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Oregon citizens harmed by an individual who decides to operate a fraud out of Blaine County.

B.

The District Court Did Not Commit Error In Refusing To Strike The Shames
Affidavit Because It Set Forth Adnzissible, Unrefuted Facts That The Wood
River Offer Was Directed to Houston In Oregon.

The uncontroverted evidence from the sworn statenients subinitled by Mr. Shanles and Mr
Houston was that all of the offers sell Wood River to Mr. Iiouston were directed to hiin or his
assistant Shames in Oregon. Record, pp. 108-109 (Shames Affidavit); Clerk's Exhibit 2,77 3 , 4
(Houston Affidavit). The Shames Affidavit directly addresses the statutory requirements of ORS
59.345, discussed at page 22, supra, which states that a sale occurs in Oregon when the offer is
directed to this state and received at tile place to which it is directed. The full portion of the
Shames Affidavit on that issue is as follows:
I, PETER SHAMES, after being duly sworn, make the following
statement based upon personal knowledge and wder the penalties of
perjury:
1. In 2004 and 2005,I was employed by Howard Houston. O n e
of my jobs was to assist him in reviewing and ultimately subscribing
for the Wood River Partners investment that this lawsuit is about.
2. I have reviewed the Affidavit of Howard Houston in Suppoll
of Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Sumnary Judgment, and know the
facts stated there regarding his purchase of the Wood River Partners
illvestillent to be accurate. I was the one who received the original
solicitation of the Wood River investment on Mr. Houston's behalf.
The original solicitation for Mr. I-Iouston to invest in Wood River
was directed to me in Hood River, Oregon, in November or
December, 2004, for forwarding to Mr. Houston. Wood River
representatives then sent Mr. Houston additional inforination about
Wood River, and directed those communications to me in Oregon.
Mr. Houstoll was also in Oregon during those times.
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R. p. 108.
The Shames Affidavit is adsnissible evidence on where the offer to purchase the Wood
River investment was directed. Indeed, it is the best evidence of that fact, since Shames "was the
one who received the original solicitation for Mr. Houston to illvest in Wood River." Those
statements are not inadnlissible hearsay. They are made by MI.. Shames, based upon his personal
knowledge. The fact that Shames states he reviewed the Houston affidavit and knows the facts
stated there regarding the purchase of the Wood River partners to be accurate is also admissible,
though not necessary for a determination on the question of where the sale occurred under Oregon
law. The Houston Affidavit, which x7as prepared before Whittier had raised his defense of the
inapplicability of Oregon law, established that the Wood River investments materials were sent to
him and Shames. Clerk's Exhibit 2 (Houston Affidavit 77 2,3), but it did not say where ihe
materials were sent to.
Whittier's reference to other paragraphs of the Affidavit are of no consequence. Shanes's
statement that he reviewed Houston's affidavit is not hearsay. Moreover, it is included as
background, and not a material fact for sumnary judgment purposes.
C.

Even If The District Court Had Improperly Applied Oregon Law, Any Error
Would Have Been Harmless Because The Liability Provisions Of Idaho's
Securities Laws Are Identical And Idaho's Damages Calculations Would Be
More Onerous To Whittier.

Oregon and Idaho both have adopted certain provisions of the Uniform Securities Act
("USA"), and for that reason their liability provisions are identical for present purposes. The laws
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of each state are reproduced below:
ORS 59,115. Liability in connection with sale or
successful solicitation of sale of securities

LC. 6 30-14-509. CIVIL LIABILITY

(1) A person is liable as provided in subsection (2) of
this section to a purcl~aserof a security if the person:

***

(b) Sells or success~llysolicits the sale of a security in
violation of ORS 59.135 (1) or (3) or by means of an
nntrne statement of a material fact or an oinission to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, UI light of the circumstances under which they are
made, not misleadimg (the buyer not knowing of the
untruth or omission), and who does not sustain t11e burden
of proof that the person did not know, and in the exercise
of reasonable care could not have known, of the untruth
or omission.

(b) A person is liable to the purchaser
if the person sells a security in violation of section
30-14-301, Idaho Code, or, by means of an unuue
statement of a material fact or an oinission to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statement
made, in light of the circumstances under which it is
inade, not misleading, the purchaser not
lcnowing the untrnth or omission and the seller not
sustaining the burden of proof that the seller did not
know and, in the exercise of reasonable care,
could not have known of the untruth or omission.

The damages provisions of the Oregon and Idaho securities acts are similar, but Idaho
actually provides gyeater damages to plaintiffs. Both states use the USA's recessionmy measure of
damages, but Idaho provides for mandatory attorney fees for prevailing plaintiffs, while Oregon
leaves the award of attorney fees to the discretion of the trial judge. And, the interest rate required
by Idaho law is lo%, wllile Oregon allows only 9%. CJ: ORS 59.1 15(2) and ORS 82.010
(providing for the rate of interest 9% per amum ~ ~ i lI.C.
l z 3 30-14-509 and 1.C. 5
28-22-104(2)(providing for interest at the rate set by the Idaho State Treasurer). The base legal
rate of interest for July 1,2007 - June 30,2008 for purposes of LC. 5 28-22-104(2) as set by the
State Treasurer is 10%. See. http:/lsto.idaho.gov~epoiis/LegalRateO~terest.aspx.
It was to Whittier's distinct advantage to proceed under the Oregon rather than the Idaho
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statutes. The 1% interest difference between the statutes of Idaho (10%) and Oregon (9%), on an
invest~nentof $2.75 million that began more than four years ago, is Inore than $100,000. The only
conceivable advantage to Whittier (who has yet to satisfy any of the judgment) from inaking this
argument is to force Houstoil to spend more money pursuing his claims. Thus, even if the district
court did commit error in applying Oregon law (and it did not), it would have been harmless error
because it did not affect Whittier's substantive rights. Snzith v. Mittoiz, 140 Idaho 893, 901, 104
P.3d 367, 375 (2004)("an error that does not affect the substantial rights of a party shall be
disregarded as hamless error").

IV.

WHITTIER'S GUILTY PLEA TO THREE FELONY COUNTS OF SECURITIES
FRAUD PRECLUDE HIM FROM DENYING FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS OF
MISREPRESENTATION AND OMISSIONS THAT ESTABLISH LIABILITY
HERE.
A.

This Court Need Not Reach The Issue Preclusion Question To Decide This
Case Because Summary Judgment Was Supported By Whittier's Failure To
Deny The Controlling Facts In This Record.

As Houston argued below, he was entitled to summary judgment both because there were
no material facts in dispute, Supreme Court Order Granting Motion, Exhibit 2 (Reply
Me~noranduinat 3), and because of the principles of issue preclusioll resulting froin TVhittiers'
guilty plea. R. p. 100 (Plaintiffs Su~nmaryJud,ae~it Memorandun at 13). This Court need not
even reach the issue of issue preclusion, because Whittier's failure to offer any evidence to
contravene tlie material facts supporting the sununary judgment fully supports The district court's
decision. See discussion supra at 17 -19,
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Whittier's argument is premised entirely upon his contention that the district court granted
summary judgment based solely on the Whittier guilty plea. Appellant's Brief at 15, 18. That is
incoi~ect.The interim order of February 1,2008, granting partial summary judgment made
findings of fact from evidence offered by Houston that were entirely independent of Whittier's
guilty plea. For exanlple, The district court found that Houston had invested $2.75 million into
Wood River. R. p. 111 (Order of February 1,2008). That finding was necessarily based upon
Houston's unopposed statement lo tl~ateffect in his affidavit. Id. at 75a.

B.

The Proper Test For Applying Issue Preclusion Resulting From A Guilty Plea
To A Subsequent Civil Action Is Found In Anderson v. City of Pocatello.

All of the arguments Whittier raises are resolved by the law set forth in Anderson v. Cifyof

Pocatello, 112 Idaho 176,731 P.2d 171 (1986). There; this Court considered the specific question
of whether a criminal conviction can serve as a collateral estoppel to bar the re-litigation of an
issue in a later civil suit involving different statutes tl1a11 those governing the criminal case. The
court stated:
we are constrained to hold that under the conditions described above,
collateral estoppel bars the relitigation of an issue detennined in a
crimiilal proceeding in which the party sought to be estopped had a
full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue
Id. at 179, 731 P.2d at 174.
Plaintiff there brought a civil rights action, after he was shot by police officers. In
connection with the incident, plaintiff had been found guilty of Idaho Code 5 18-3304,
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Intelltionally Aiming a F i r e m at Others. The court held that, as a result of the conviction,
plaintiff "was estopped from denying that he had pointed his shotgun at someone, at some point in
time." Id. at 185, 731 P.2d 180. Obviously, the civil rights action was based upon a different
statute than the criminal statute to which plaintiff had pled guilty. In that case, there remained the
issue of whether the plaintiff was pointing his gun at the officers at the time he was shot, and for
that reason, summary judgment was denied to the defendants, but the estoppel ruling, which was
one of first impression in Idaho, was clear and stands today.
The Anderson court addressed the issue of "mutuality" which has in some circunlstances
been held to require that the parties in both cases be identical before issue preclusion applies. This
C o w criticized that requirement in the criminal case context, saying:
To permit relitigation of an issue that was hlly and fairly litigated
and lost in a prior action undermines the worthwhile purposes of the
collateral estoppel rule witliout serving any other recogilizahle good
purpose. This is particularly bue when tlze party sought to be
estopped was the defeizdarzt in aprior crinzinal action resulfing in
conviction, ivlzere tlze safeguards and burden ofprooffavored the
defendant.

Id. at 183, 731 P.2d at 178. (emphasis added).
The Anderson case held that the more appropriate test is (1) whether the criminal defendant
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue; (2) are the issues in the two cases identical; and
(3) were the issues actually decided. Id. Here, all three parts of the test were met.
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C.

Each of the Three Elements Of The Anderson Test Were Satisfied.
1.

Full and fair o ~ ~ o r t u ~toi tlitigate.
y

Wliittier had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of his guilt of securities fraud.
Clerk's Exhibit 1 (Declaration of Robert S. Banks, Jr., Exhibit C, pp. 7 - 12 (Whittier's guilty plea
in open court, acknowledging his understanding of the proceedings, his rights, and that he could
receive up to 235 months in prison)).
2.

Identical Issues.

Whittier contends that his guilty plea lo securities fraud should not prevent him from
litigating the issue here because he pled guilty to federal securities fraud but not Oregon securities
fraud. However, the issues and elements of the Oregon and federal laws are identical. Whittier
pleaded guilty to Rule 10b-5 of the 1934 Securities Act in connection with Wood River. Supreme
Court Order Granting Motion, Exhibit l(Whittier's Memorandum Ln Opposition To Plaintiffs
Motion For Partial Summary Judgrtlent, at 9). That criminal couilt is virtually identical to the First
Claim For Relief in this case, alleging violations of ORS 59.135. The laws goveniing the criminal
count to which l a i t t i e r pleaded guilty, and the second claim for relief here, are as follows:
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I

Criminal lildictinent Count 1

First Claim For Relief

17 CFR 6 240.10b-5

Fraud and deceit with respect to securities or securities
business. ORS 59.135.

It shall be unlawhl for any person, directly or indirectly,
by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate
coillinere, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,

It is unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any secuvity or
the conduct of a securities business or for any person
who receives any consideratioil from another person
primarily for advising the other person as to the value of
securities or their purchase or sale, whether through the
issua~ceof analyses or reports or otl~eiwise:
(1) To employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud;

(b) To make any untrue statement of material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessay in order to make
the stateillents made, in light of the circuinstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or

(2) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they are made, not misleading;

(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit
upon any person,

(3) To engage in any act, practice or course of business
which ooerates or would onerate as a fraud or deceit
upon any person;

The facts supporting the criminal guilty plea and those alleged here are also identical. The
conduct which Whittier admitted to is the same conduct that defrauded Mr. Houston out of $2.75
million. The Indictment alleges that Whittier engaged in a scheme to defraud Wood River
investors. Clerk's Exhibit 1 (Declaration of Robert S. Banks , Jr. In Support of Motion For Partial
Summary Judgment, Exh B, p 3, q/ 9.) The Indictment charges that Whittier falsely represented
that Wood River pursued a broad investment strategy and that no investment would constitute
more than tell percent of the holdings. In fact, the Indictment charged, Wood River's holdings of
Endwave stock far exceeded ten percent. And, Whittier misrepresented to investors that the fund
was being audited by outside auditors, when it was not. Id.
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The complaint here describes the same fraudulent scheme, and maltes the very same
allegations. Paragraph 14 alleges that the offering meinorandurn misrepresented that Wood River
would make diversified iilvestn~elltsand that individual investments would be capped at ten
percent of original costs. R. pp. 9-10. Paragraph 16 alleges that Wood River misrepresented that
an auditor had been appointed for Wood River. R. pp. 10-11. Houston's Affidavit details the
same facts: that he read the offe~ingmemorandum, and was led to believe that he was investing in
a disciplined, diversified fund. Clerk's Exhibit 2,¶7 3,4,7-9. Those are precisely the acts which
Whittier pleaded guilty and admitted to in his criminal case.

3.

Actuallv decided.

Whittier pleaded guilty to charges that his conduct in operating Wood River violated SEC
Rule lob-5, which, as shown above, is the same as Oregon's ORS 59.135. Moreover, Whittier
specifically admitted in open court in his criminal case that (a) he was general partner of Wood
River; (b) he engaged in wrongful conduct, including intentionally coilcealing the size of the fund's
position in Endwave, which he admits was material to investors; (c) he intentionally misled
investors in several ways, including intentionally failing to file SEC forins to disclose Wood
River's over-concentrated position in Endwave. R. pp. 96-97; Clerk's Exhibit 1, Exhibit C, pp. 1415. )
Whittier never denied Houston's allegatioils of misrepresentations and omissions in
connection with the sale of Wood River because Whittier had already admitted them in connection
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with his plea bargain with the United States. Whittier could not deny the misrepreselltations
because lie had already aclcnowledged that they were true.
V.

WITTIER'S ARGUMENT THAT HOUSTON FAILED TO TENDER THE WOOD
RIVER SECURITIES TO HIM IS CONTRADICTED BY THE RECORD AND
MISSTATES THE TENDER REQUIREMENT.
Like other unifonn securities act states, Oregon requires that the plaintiff tender his

securities prior to entry of judgment against a defendant in a case brought under ORS 59.115 or
ORS 59.135. ORS 59.115 provides:

2) The purchaser may recover:
(a) Upon tender of the securitv, the consideration paid for the
security, and interest from the date of payment
Houstoll tendered his Wood River securities to Whittier prior to the entry of judgment by
letter froin I-Iouston's counsel to Whittier's counsel on March 3, 2008, stating :
We are tendering to you Howard Houston's rights, title and interest
in the Wood River Partners securities, which we will deliver upon
receipt of payment by your client or others of the full amount of the
principal and interest stated in the proposed judgment.
R. p. 140.
That is all the law requires. Whittier contends tliat I-Iouston must actually deliver the
securities to Whittier before Houston can have judgment, and that Whittier gets the securities
without having to pay for them. As Houston explained in the district court, that is not the law. R.
p p 139-141, 155-159. If it were, Whittier would receive an unjust windfall even after committing
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securities fraud. Whittier has not paid anything toward this judgment. There will be some
repayment to Wood River investors from the Wood River Receiver and the United States
Attorney's office. (The receiver has been liquidating all of Wood River's holdings and anticipates
a distribution). Mr. Houston hopes to recover somewhere around $200,000 - $400,000 from those
distributions. Those amounts will partially satisfy the Judgment against Whittier, and the Final
Judgment so provides. The Final Judgment also requires Mr. Houston to file partial satisfactions
of judgment whenever he receives any recovery froin any other source. See: R. p. 157 (Final
Judgment); pp. 140-141 (Banks Affidavit).
In telling fashion, Whinier wanted the district court, and now wants the Idaho Supreme
Court, to require Houston to deliver the rights to the Wood River securities to Whittier. The only
reason is that Whittier wants to receive for hiniself I-Iouston's portion all of the restitution and
recovery funds that were paid (see Order Granting Motion, Exhibit G - Partial Satisfaction of
Judgment) and that Houston anticipates and hopes will be paid by the receiver.'
The cases that Whittier cites luerely confirm that statutory requireinent - that plaintiff must
tender his shares to receive the consideration paid for them. Defendant's citation to a quote from

'Whittier also contends that he is entitled to Wood River securities when others pay
Houston. Appellants Brief at 35-36, n. 12. Houston did as he was required to do when he
recovered any funds from other sources -he reduced the amount of judgment owing by Whittier
by filing a Partial Satisfaction of Judgment. Order Granting Motion, Exhibit 6. A partial
recovery by Houston does not entitle Whittier, who has paid nothing, to receive a percentage of
any other sources of recovery.
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Metal Tech Corp. v. Metal Teckniques Co., 74 Ore. App. 297, 703 P.2d 237 (1985), is incomplete
and potentially misleading. The case does not hold that in order to tender, a prevailing party in an
ORS 59.1 15 case must deliver the stock to the losing party, as Whittier suggests. The .Metal Tech
appeals court concellled a standing issue, i.e., whether plaintiff had standing to bring a shareholder
derivative claims against individual defendants. The trial court granted sumnary judgment to
defendant on that claim. Plaintiff had no standing to pursue the derivative claims since the court
had already granted rescission to the defendant, thus divesting plaintiff of l ~ i stock
s
in the company
on whose behalf he sought to bring the derivative claims. The court of appeals reversed the
standing decision. It noted that there was a1unresolved counterclaim against plaintiff for
violations of ORS 59.115 in connection with the transaction that had already been rescinded. If
defendants prevailed on that claim, they would have to tender their shares back to plaintiff, and he
would then acquire future standing to bbrillg his derivative claims. Tlle tender requirement of ORS
59.115(2)(a) were not at issue in the case; indeed, the court reversed a grant of summary judgment
on the statutory claim, and remanded it for trial. And, it was clear there that plaintiff would reacquire the stock in order to obtain standing to pursue his derivative claims. Neither Metal Tech,
nor any other case in Oregon, holds that a plaintiff must deliver his securities without payinent
before he can obtain a judgment.
The rescissionary measure of damages in the blue sky laws allow a plaintiff to unwind the
transaction. To put the parties in the positions they were in prior to the transaction, as rescission
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requires, a plaintiff tenders the security back, and the defendant retuns the money paid. The 2002
Uniforn~Securities Act itself makes that clear. It provides:
SECTION 509. CIVIL LIABILITY
(a)(l) The purchaser may maintain an action to recover the consideration paid for
the security, less the amount of any income received on the security, and interest [at
the legal rate of interest] from the date of the purchase, costs, and reasonable
attorneys' fees detern~inedby the court, upon the tender of the security, or for actual
danlages as provided in paragraph (3).
(2)
, , The tender referred to in paragraph
- - - (1)
. . may be made any time before entry of
judgment. Tender requires onlv notice in a record of ownership of the securitv and
willingness to exchange the securitv for the amount specified.

(Emphasis added.) A copy of the relevant pages of the 2002 Uniform Securities Act is a part of the
record at R. p. 158-159.
The words "tender" and "deliver" are distinct throughout the law. Another exsunple in
Oregon is ORS 20.080, which provides for attorney fees in small cases unless defendant had
previously tendered the damages. It provides as follows:
(1) In any action for damages for an injury or wrong to the person or
property, or both, of another where the amount pleaded is $ 5,500 or
less, and the plaintiff prevails in the action, there shall be taxed and
allowed to the plaintiff, at trial and on appeal, a reasonable amount to
be fixed by the court as attorney fees for the prosecution of the
action, if the cou-t finds that wriaen demand for the payment of such
claim was made on the defendant not less thail 10 days before the
commencement of the action. . . However, no attorney fees shall be
allowed to the plaintiff if the court finds that the defendant tendered
to the plaintiff, prior to the commencemeilt of the action . . . an
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amount not less than the damages awarded to the plaintiff.
As the courts have recognized in that context, "tei~der"refers to an ''ofer of settlement."

F ~ e s kv. K~aenzer,337 Ore. 513,524-525 (Or. 2004)(enlphasis added). The defendant need not
deliver payment to the plaintiff in order to comply with the statute. And, the defendant can
condition the tender upon the delivery of a release by the plaintiff. Id.
Whittier's argument makes no sense, and there is no Oregon case that supports such a
nonsensical position. I11 his reading of ORS 59.115(2)(a), Iloustoil clearly has an obligation to
tender his securities upon payment for them, but he has no obligation to deliver them until he is
paid. If it were otherwise, whenever there were multiple defendants in a securities case, any one of
them could accept the tender, take the securities without paying for them, and claim the proceeds
from any recovery froin any of the other defendants.

VI.

WHITTIER'S ARGUMENT THAT HOUSTON DID NOT MOVE FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON THE ISSUE OF DAMAGES HAS NO SUPPORT IN THE
RECORD BECAUSE HOUSTON SPECIFICALLY MOVED FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON TWO CLAIMS FOR RELIEF AND INTRODUCED ALE THE
REQUIRED EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE AMOUNT OF RESCISSIONARY
DAMAGES.
Houston moved for summary judgment on his first claim for relief for violations of ORS

59.135 and on his second claim for relief for violations of ORS 59.115. R. pp. 85-87. In support
of that motion, Houstoli submitted an affidavit ill which he detailed the dates and amounts of his
investment. Clerk's Exhibit 2 , 7 6. (Affidavit of Howard Houston).
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Houston's first and second claims for relief award statutory damages based upon a theory of
rescission. ORS 59.1 15(2) provides:
2) The purchaser may recover:
(a) Upon tender of the security, the consideration paid for the
security, and interest from the date of payment equal to the greater of
the rate of interest specified in ORS 82.010 for judgments for the
payment of money or the rate provided in the security if the security
is an interest-bearing obligation, less any amount received on the
security
Houston's evidence allowed the district court to calculate the amount of damages to which
Houston was entitled.
Despite those facts, Whittier appeals the decision, arguing that Houston never requested
s m m y judgment on the issue of damages. Although he was given ample opportunity to do so,
Whittier never challenged the dates or amounts of Houston's investments, because there was no
basis to do so.
Whittier's argument is frivolous. As the district court correctly ruled:
Houston moved for summay judgment based upon, among other
things, the affidavit of Howard Houston filed on October 30,2007.
That affidavit clearly sets forth that amounts that Houston paid to
Wood River Partners. The amount and timing of these payment was
never controverted by defendant Whittier. . . [Pllaintiff Houston
never limited his motion solely to the issue of liability. Indeed, he
moved for summary judgment on his first and second claims set forth
in his complaint. Accordingly, a finding pursuant to Rule 56(d) as to
the amoulit and timing of payments made by Houston, which formed
the basis of the damages claim, was appropriate upon sulnmay
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CONCLUSION
For all the reasons set forth in this brief, the Respondent respecthlly requests this Court to
affirm the district court's judgment, and to award the respondent his attorney fees and costs on
appeal.
Respectfully submitted on December 4,2008

BANI$?LAWOFFICE, P.C.

Ned Williamson
Attorney At Law
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